Burge v. City and County of San Francisco by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
10-20-1953
Burge v. City and County of San Francisco
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Burge v. City and County of San Francisco 41 Cal.2d 608 (1953).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/341
/) 
608 BURGE V. CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO (41 C.2<1 
[So F. No. 18876. In Bank. Oct. 20, 1953.] 
LYNDLE E. BURGE, a Minor, etc., Appellant, v. CITY 
AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent. 
[1] Judgments - Collateral Attack - Presumptions: Motions-
Orders-Oollateral Attack.-Ordinarily when an order or a 
judgment of court of general jurisdiction is collaterally at-
tacked, the only evidence that may be considered in deter-
mining whether order or judgment is void is the record in the 
proceeding in which it was entered, and if the record is silent 
as to existence of a jurisdictional fact, that fact will be pre-
sumed. 
(2] Id. - Oollateral Attack - Presumptions.-If a proceeding is 
wholly statutory and unknown to common law the court, even 
though ordinarily one of general jurisdiction, is a court of 
special jurisdiction for that proceeding, and if jurisdictional 
facts do not appear of record in such proceeding, there is no 
presumption of regularity. 
[3] Id.-Proof of Judgments-Extrinsic Eviclence.-Where pre-
sumption of regularity of proceedings is not applicable in a 
proceeding which is wholly statutory and unknown to common 
law, the failure of the record to recite a jurisdictional fact 
does not make judgment void, because extrinsic evidence is ad-
missible to prove such fact except where some statute makes 
record the exclusive mode of proof. 
[4] Infants-Olaims-Compromise or Release.-Without statutory 
authority a parent, as such, cannot compromise or release his 
child's cause of action. 
[5] Id.-Olaims-Oompromise.-Whether proceedings under Prob. 
Code, § 1431, relating to compromise of a minor's disputed 
claim, are entitled to presumption of regularity need not be 
decided on collateral attack if jurisdictional facts are estab-
lished by extrinsic evidence. 
[6] Id.-Olaims-Oompromise.-Under Prob. Code, § 1431, to estab-
lish right of mother to compromise a minor's disputed claim, 
it ~ust be shown, if father is not dead, that father and mother 
are living separate or apart, that mother has care or custody 
. [1] See Cal.Jur., Judgments, § 150; Motions and Orders, § 26. 
[4] Release or compromise by parent of cause of action for in-
juries to child as affecting right of child, Dote 103 A..L.R. 500. See, 
also, Am.Jur., Parent and Child, § 34. 
Kelt. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § 297; Motions, § 25; 
[2] Judgments, § 296; [3] Judgments, § 540; [4-10, 12-14, 17-19] 
Infants, § 2a; [11] Divorce, § 275; [15,16] Parent and Child, § 5. 
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of minor, that compromise bas approval of superior court of 
county wbere minor resides, and that a verified petition in 
writing seeking approval of compromise bas been filed with 
such court. 
[7] Id.-Olaims-Oompromise.-Although it would ordinarily be 
better practice to hold a hearing on mother's petition for ap-
proval of compromise of minor's disputed claim, the statute 
(Prob. Code, § 1431) does not require it. (Disapproviag in~ 
timation to contrary in Berry v. Ohaplin, 74 Cal.App.2d 602, 
660 [169 P.2d 442J.) 
[8] Id.-Olaims-Oompromise.-Amendment of Probe Code, § 1431, 
in 1939 so as to provide that claim of minor against third 
person may be compromised by "his father, or if his father 
is dead or the parents of said minor are living separate or 
apart and his motber then bas care or custody of said minor 
then his mother," covers not only case of desertion or aban-
donment but any ease where father and mother are living 
separate or apart, wbether reason therefor be desertion, aban-
donment, agreement of the parties or divorce. 
[9] Id.-Olaims-Oompromise.-By using word "cUitody" in 1939 
amendment of Prob. Code, § 1431, the Legislature made it clear 
that if mother and father are living separate or apart, mother 
has authority to compromise a minor's disputed claim if she 
has custody of minor, whether she has that custody by virtue 
of father's abandonment of his family, his inaltility or refusal 
to take custody, or by virtue of court order awarding her 
custody. 
[10] Id.-Claims-Oustody.-An award of joint custody with 
father would not be sWDcient to give mother authority to 
compromise a minor's disputed claim. 
[11] Divorce - Oustody of Ohildren - To Whom Awarded.-A 
divorce decree that awards parents joint custody of cbild 
leaves right to custody as it was during marriage wben they 
Were living together and gives neither a greater right than 
he or she had before divorce. 
[12] lDfa.nts-Olaims-Oompromise.-"Custody" as used in Prob. 
Code, § 1431, relating to compromise of a minQr's disputed 
claim by mother when parents are living apart and mother has 
care or custody means complete or exclusive custody. 
[13] Id.-Olaims-Oompromise.-Addition of words "care or" be-
fore word "custody" in Prob. Code, § 1431, relating to com~ 
promise of a minor's disputed claim, indicates a clear legisla-
tive purpose not to limit mother's authority to cases in which 
she has custody. 
[14] Id.-Olaims-Oompromise.-Prob. Code, § 1431, relating to 
compromise of a minor's disputed claim, no more limits "Care" 
a c.M-IO 
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to some cases of care t1.an it limits "custody" to some cases 
of custody; it may not be interpreted as giving either "care" 
or "custody" alternative meanings or to make either controlling 
in some cases and Dot in others. 
[16] Parent and Ohlld-Oustody.-Custody embraces sum of pa-
rental rights with respect to the rearing of a child, including 
its care; it includes right to child's services and earnings 
(Civ. Code, § 197) and right to direct his activities and make 
decisions regarding his care and control, education, health 
and religion. 
[16] Id.-Oustody.-When parents are living separate or apart 
a court may conclude that best interests of child and due re-
gard for interests of pareuts require that one or other be given 
complete cu;;tody, or it may award "legal custody" to one or 
both parents and "physical custody" to one parent with or 
without right of visitation by other parent, or physical cus-
tody may be awarded to a third person. usually a relative. 
[17] Infants - Olaims - Oompromise.-ln using words "care or 
custody" in Prob. Code, § 1431, relating to compromise of a 
minor's disputed claim, the Legislature by "custody" meant 
complete custody or all rights involved in custody, and by 
. "care" meant what has commonly been called "physical cus-
tody" or custodial rights involved in physical care and control 
of child. 
[18] Id.-01a.ims-Oompromise.-If parents are living separate or 
apart and mother has care or physical custody of child. she 
may compromise his claims even thOUgh she mayor may not 
have his complete custody. 
[19] Id. - Olaims - Oompromise.-Where parents under divorce 
decree have "joint custody and control" of child but mother 
has "personal custody," award of personal custody gives her 
physical custody and care of child and she therefore has 
authority under Prob. Code, § 1431, to compromise disputed 
claim of child. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. I. L. Harris, Judge. 
Affirmed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries. Judgment for 
defendant affirmed. 
John F. O'Sullivan, MjJ1jngton, De11'Ergo, Weeks & Mor-
rissey for Appellant. 
Dion R. Holm, City Attorney, and Clayton W. Hom, 
Deputy City Attorney, for Respondent. 
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TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff Lyndle E. Burge, a minor, by his 
father as guardian ad litem, brought this action against de-
fendant city and county of San Francisco to recover dam-
ages for personal injuries suffered by him while he was a 
passenger on a street-railway car operated by defendant. 
Defendant filed an answer pleading as a special defense that 
plaintiff's claim had previously been compromised by his 
mother in a proceeding under section 1431 of the Probate 
Code. Thf' issue so raised was tried separately pursuant to 
section 597 of the ('.ode of Civil Procedure. The court con-
cluded that the order approving the compromise was not 
subject to collateral attack and entered judgment in favor 
of defendant. Plaintiff appeals. He concedes that the at-
tack is collateral but contends that the court had no juris-
diction ~o approve the compromise on the grounds that the 
petition for approval of the compromise and the order ap-
proving it were fatally defective in failing to recite jurisdic-
tiona1 facts and that even if these facts could he proved in 
the present proceeding the record therein discloses that his 
mother was without authority to compromise his claim. . We 
have concluded that this contention cannot be sustained and 
that the judgment must therefore be affirmed. 
Plaintiff was 14 years old at the time of the accident. His 
father and mother had previously been divorced. The inter-
locutory decree provided that "plaintiff [father] and de-
fendant r mother] have joint custody and control of the said 
minor children, with personal custody in the defendant, and 
the plaintiff has the right and privilege to visit said minor 
children and take them out at all reasonable times." Plain-
tiff was one of the minor children mentioned in the decree 
and lived with his mother after the divorce. 
All negotiations leading to the compromise were conducted 
between plaintiff's mother and defendant. Plaintiff's father 
knew that the accident had occurred and that a claim had 
been filed, but he did not participate in tht! compromise pro-
ceedings or become aware of the compromise until after it 
had been made. Plaintiff's mother agreed to release his claim 
against defendant upon the payment of $500. She filed with 
the superior court a verified petition seeking approval of the 
eompromise, and it was approved. Defendant paid the $500 
and plaintiff's mother executed a release. The present action 
was brought before plaintiff reached majoritT. 
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oonsent statute did not allow maintenance of the action. The 
statements in Melvin v. State, supra, 121 Cal. 16, 22, indi-
cating that the State Agricultural Society engages in govern-
mental activities only in conducting the state fair are in-
consistent with the foregoing cases and are disapproved. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J .• and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
